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I. INTRODUCTION

If the New Jersey Supreme Court, in its landmark 1975 decision
of Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel I)' established a constitutional right to affordable housing, 2 the ensuing eight years saw little recognition of that
right. 3 In 1983, however, in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P.
v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II),4 the court established procedures and set forth unique remedies designed to breathe
life into Mount Laurel 1.5 This article will review the substantial
changes in New Jersey zoning and planning procedures created by
Mount Laurel II, and will itemize some of the critical questions which
should be considered by Mount Laurel litigants.
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67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel I].
' See id. at 179-82, 336 A.2d at 727-29. As the Mount Laurel I court noted: "It is plain
beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is certainly
an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all land use regulation." Id.
at 179, 336 A.2d at 727; see also Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: The Mount Laurel Doctrine
and the Implications of the Madison Township Case, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 460, 467 n.24
(1977).
' See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977) (numerical specification of municipalities' "'fair share" obligation not required); Pascack
Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor of Township of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977) (zoning
ordinance in developed single-family unit township which precluded all multifamily housing
upheld in disregard of regional shortage); Fobe Assocs. v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379
A.2d 31 (1977) (zoning ordinance valid despite absolute prohibition of multifamily residential
buildings).
4 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel Il].
5 The Mount Laurel II court discussed those measures which would be available for
municipalities to meet their "Mount Laurel obligation." See generally Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at
258-78, 456 A.2d at 441-62. Further, the court gave an overview of those remedies available to
litigants who successfully challenged exclusionary zoning ordinances. See generally id. at 278-92,
456 A.2d at 452-59.
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A. Prelude to Mount Laurel II
During New Jersey's post-World War II boom period of suburban expansion, exclusionary zoning 6 proved to be an enormously
effective device to bar low and moderate income families from entering suburban communities. 7 Throughout this period the New Jersey
Supreme Court sidestepped these local segregative efforts by upholding a series of exclusionary zoning ordinances. 8 By the 1960's, however, the negative results of this municipal practice became disturbingly apparent. As land in suburbia became more scarce and thus
more costly, only fairly affluent citizens were able to pay the additional exclusionary zoning "toll" necessary to acquire suburbia's expensive housing. Many of New Jersey's poorer citizens, with little hope
that affordable homes would be built for them, found themselves
locked into the state's deteriorating older cities. The depth of the
housing crisis that developed during the 1960's was underscored by
clear warnings which demonstrated the need for change, from the
spread of rent control 9 to the Newark riots of 1967. 10 Nevertheless, the
S"'Exclusionary zoning" refers to those methods of land use regulation which "have either
the purpose or effect of excluding or sharply limiting low- and moderate-priced housing from the
municipality in question, and thus that exclude persons of low or moderate income." Note, The
Inadequacy of JudicialRemedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MIcHi. L. REv. 760, 760 n. 1
(1976). The term is difficult to define precisely because in a sense all zoning laws are -exclusionary" since they preclude tracts of land from being put to whatever use an owner desires; in the
context of "open housing," however, it focuses on discrimination based on differences in wealth
or income. See Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and a Reluctant Supreme Court. 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 107, 107 n.4 (1977). See generally Burns, Class Struggle in the Suburbs:
Exclusionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179 (1975); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971).
7 FAIR SHARE HOUSING: A CONFERENCE ON NEW JERSEY ISSUES (Rutgers Press, Apr. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as FAIR SHARE HOUSING]: Comment, supra note 6. at 108.
1 Historically, the New Jersey Supreme Court has given great deference to municipal
zoning determinations. In Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952), the court noted that the constitutional revision in 1947 and the revision of the
enabling zoning statutes in 1948 had expanded the scope of municipal zoning power. Id. at 170,
89 A.2d at 695. Additionally, the court asserted that "by Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 11 of the
Constitution of 1947 . . . we are required to construe the constitutional and statutory provisions
pertaining to zoning liberally in favor of a municipality.' Id. Accordingly, the court upheld
virtually all "reasonable" uses by a municipality of its zoning powers. See, e.g., Fanale v.
Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958) (zoning ordinance prohibiting construction
of any multiple family dwelling upheld).
9 At the time that Mount Laurel I was decided, over 110 New Jersey municipalities had rent
control ordinances. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1976, § 8, at 1, col. 1. Many authorities have recognized
restrictive zoning ordinances as a primary cause of the rent control movement. See, e.g., Baar,
Rent Control in the 1970's: The Case of the New Jersey Tenants Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
631, 633 (1977).
10 See Comment, Recovery From Urban Riots- Toward A Comprehensive Plan, 33 ALB. L.
REV. 582 (1969) (discussing better housing as solution for inner city unrest).
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New Jersey Legislature, perhaps more sensitive to the desires of suburban voters than to the needs of city dwellers, ignored these omens.
1. Gubernatorial Frustration
The executive was the first branch of New Jersey's government to
recognize the need for the construction of affordable housing for low
and moderate income groups, and to attempt to fashion a solution. In
1970, Governor William Cahill, in a special message to the New
Jersey Legislature, pointed to the "systematic exclusion of many people, including a large segment of our middle income sector"" from
New Jersey's suburbs, and warned of the "devastating effect" that
exclusionary zoning was visiting upon the state's cities.1 2 Despite this
and similar admonitions throughout his one-term administration,
Governor Cahill was generally ignored by the legislature. 13 His successor, Governor Brendan Byrne, responding to the Mount Laurel I
decision of March 1975, embarked upon an ambitious housing allocation program designed to eradicate exclusionary zoning.' 4 Faced with
the same lack of legislative enthusiasm as was his predecessor, Governor Byrne decided to take action. In April 1976, he issued Executive
Order No. 35, which ordered the Director of the Division of State and
Regional Planning to "prepare State housing goals to guide municipalities in adjusting their municipal land-use regulations in order to
provide a reasonable opportunity for the development of an appropriate variety and choice of housing to meet the needs of the residents of
New Jersey.' 5 Governor Byrne took further action in December 1976

1 A BlueprintforHousing in New Jersey, A Special Message by Governor William T. Cahill,
at 11 (Dec. 7, 1970).
12 Id.
'3

See FAIR SHARE HOuSING. supra note 7, at 33.

Id. at 34-35. Governor Byrne noted the socio-political ills which arose in part as a result of
I4
exclusionary zoning, including the depressed housing industry, capital expenditures due solely to
the distance of suburbs from centers of employment, unemployment among tradesmen, and
increased housing costs. See First Annual Message to Legislature by Governor Brendan T. Byrne,
at 11 (Jan. 14, 1975). In 1975, a report entitled "An Analysis of Low and Moderate Income
Housing Needs in New Jersey" was published by the Department of Community Affairs. The
report "documented a serious shortage of adequate and affordable housing." which prompted
Governor Byrne into action. See FAIR SHARE HOUSING, supra note 7, at 34.
'1 Exec. Order No. 35, 1976 N.J. Laws 665, reprinted in FAIR SHARE HOUSING. supra note 7,
at 88. Executive Order No. 35 served as notice that the Governor was fully aware of the severe
lack of adequate housing in New Jersey and the role which restrictive land use regulations played
in exacerbating the shortage. See id. at 87. The Director was not only ordered to determine the
"state housing need," but also to "formulate a *State Housing Goal' and allocate this goal to each
county or group of counties.- Id. at 88-89. The Director was to consider county-wide need,
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with the issuance of Executive Order No. 46, which ordered the
Director of the Division to "review and if necessary modify" the
preliminary housing allocation goals drafted in response to Executive
Order No. 35.16 This revised plan resulted in the promulgation of the
State Development Guide Plan (SDGP).' 7 In 1981, however, Governor Byrne's two executive orders were rescinded by Governor Thomas
Kean, who did not share his two predecessors' enthusiasm for the
Mount Laurel I doctrine.' 8
2. Legislative Inaction
The initiatives taken by Governors Cahill and Byrne failed to
inspire action by the New Jersey Legislature. In 1975, Senator Martin
Greenberg (D-Essex), a former law partner of Governor Byrne, proposed a Comprehensive and Balanced Housing Plan Bill. 9 This proemployment growth, fiscal capacity, site availability, and other factors in allocating the county
housing goals. Id. at 89. Further, he was to suballocate housing goals on the municipal level, or
delegate this responsibility to each county's planning board. Id. at 90-91. Those municipalities
which were successful in implementing programs to meet their "fair share" of low and moderate
income housing needs were to be rewarded with increased state aid for municipal public works
projects. Id. at 91-92.
16 Exec. Order No. 46, 1976 N.J. Laws 685, reprinted in FAIR SHARE HOUSING, supra note 7,
at 93.

1

N.J.DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, DIVISION OF STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING, STATE

(May 1980) [hereinafter cited as SDGP]. The SDGP provides a
statewide blueprint for future development . . . [as] the only official determination of the state's
plan for its own future development and growth." Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A.2d at
423-24. The SDGP was patterned after other regional planning documents, such as those
prepared by the Tri-State Regional Planning Association and the Delaware Valley Regional
Planning Association. Id., 456 A.2d at 424. Chief Justice Wilentz described the origins of the
SDGP as follows:
The SDGP resulted from an intensive study of all aspects of New Jersey's current
growth and development considered in conjunction with the "physical assets" of the
state: its natural resources, open spaces, farmland, "infrastructure" (transportation,
sewage facilities, water supplies and facilities), including the location of present
intensive development, employment centers, community facilities, recreation areas,
etc.
Id. (footnote omitted).
On the concept map, drawn in conjunction with the SDCP's master plan, the state was
divided into six basic areas: growth, limited growth, agriculture, conservation, pinelands, and
coastal zones. The concept map made it clear how every municipality in the state should be
classified. Id. The county concept maps are reproduced in the Appendix to the Mount Laurel II
opinion. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 354-74, 456 A.2d at 491-510.
IS See Exec. Order No. 6, slip form (May 4, 1982). The Governor's executive order, in
rescinding Executive Orders Nos. 35 and 46, undermined the Housing Allocation Report (HAR)
which had been prepared pursuant to these latter orders. See Mt. Laurel I1, 92 N.J. at 251, 456
A.2d at 437. The SDGP, however, prepared pursuant to a statutory grant of authority, remained
unaffected. Id. at 225, 456 A.2d at 423.
"I S. 505, 198th N.J. Leg., 1st Sess. (1978) (Greenberg Bill), reprinted in FAIR SHARE
HOUSING, supra note 7, at 96-136.
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE PLAN
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posed legislation, designed to create a "better distribution of housing
opportunities ' ' 20 through the implementation of mandatory housing
22
quotas, 2' was initially supported by the League of Municipalities.
The League withdrew its support for the Greenberg Bill, however,
when its members objected to abandonment of home rule in favor of a
housing allocation plan to be prepared by a new entity, the State
Council on Housing and Site Location Planning. 23 Ultimately, the
proposed legislation died in committee after the $700,000 figure originally appropriated in the bill for county and municipal housing studies was reduced to $75,000.24
In 1975, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Municipal Land
Use Law (MLUL). 25 Despite the fact that this legislation was passed
after the Mount Laurel I decision, the MLUL was merely a procedural device-it "was not a legislative effort aimed at creating balanced housing opportunities in New Jersey. ' 26 Although it had the
opportunity to do so, the legislature did not incorporate the concept of
low and moderate income housing into the MLUL as a goal of municipal land use planning and development. Thus today the legislatively
created MLUL coexists with the judicial land use law developed in
Mount Laurel I and II; there is no precise synchronization of these
two bodies of law.
3. Judicial Action and Confusion
In Mount Laurel I the New Jersey Supreme Court, filling the
void left by the legislature, undertook an activist role in declaring a
new principle which placed an affirmative obligation on municipalities to encourage the development of economically diverse communities. 27 Nevertheless, in subsequent decisions the court seemed to re-

20

FAIR SHARE HOUSING, supra note 7, at 96-97.

21 See id. at 101-02.
22

Id. at 58.

23 Id. at 76. Fred Stickel III, speaking for the League of Municipalities, said that the League

believed that "[t]he more that local governments are involved in the planning process, the more
effective and acceptable will be the ultimate results." Id. Stickel further noted that the absence
of local involvement would preclude League approval. See id.
24 Id. at 76-77.
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -99 (West cum. Supp. 1983-1984) [hereinafter cited as
MLUL]. See infra notes 37-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the MLUL.
26 Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 320, 456 A.2d at 474. The Mount Laurel II court noted that the
legislative history of the MLUL indicated that it was intentionally separated from S. 505. See id.
27 See Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J.
at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25. The court asserted that ever%
"developing municipality" must "by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically
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treat from this doctrine. In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison28 the court subtly altered "the mandate of Mount Laurel" by
speaking in terms of a municipality's "bona fide" efforts at providing
"least cost housing" 29 rather than in the Mount Laurel court's terms of
zoning for low and moderate income housing. 30 In Pascack Association, Ltd. v. Mayor of Washington Township 3' the court established
an artificial "developing/developed" dichotomy by holding that a
moderate to low density, upper-middle income township of mostly
single-family homes was not required to zone for middle income
multi-family housing despite the deficiency of such housing in Bergen
32
County.
In the wake of the Pascack and Madison Township decisions,
New Jersey's lower courts began to circumscribe the Mount Laurel I
doctrine. 33 In 1983, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court in

possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing ... [and] it cannot foreclose the opportunity . . . for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford
that opportunity...." Id.. 336 A.2d at 724.
28 72 N.J. 481 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
21 See generally id. at 510-14, 371 A.2d at 1206-08 (comparison of "least cost" housing with
"low and moderate income" housing). "Least cost" housing was defined by the Mount Laurel II
court as "the least expensive housing that builders can provide after removal by a municipality of
all excessive restrictions and exactions and after thorough use by a municipality of all affirmative
devices that might lower costs." Mt. Laurel I, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451 (emphasis in
original).
10Mt. Laurel 1. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. In addition to the "least cost" housing option
as a means of escape from Mount Laurel obligations, the court noted that it would not "require
the trial court to specify a pertinent region or fix a fair share housing quota." Madison Township,
72 N.J. at 543, 371 A.2d at 1223. In fact, the court directed that trial courts simply examine
whether municipalities have made "bona fide efforts toward the elimination or minimization of
undue cost-generating requirements." id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200 (emphasis in original). One
commentator has suggested that the court utilized several practical considerations in Madison
Township in deciding to restrict its mandate to generalities, including the court's realization that
numerical housing goals could not be readily translated into substantive changes in zoning
ordinances. See Comment, supra note 2, at 482.
31 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
32 Pascack, 74 N.J. at 477, 379 A.2d at 9: see also Fobe Assocs. v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J.
519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977) ("developed" community's absolute ban on multifamily buildings
upheld).
33 See Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township, 164 N.J. Super. 563, 397 A.2d 384 (Law
Div. 1978) (township's failure to shed rural characteristics precludes imposition of Mount Laurel
obligation), aJfd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 1'58, 456 A.2d 390 (1983); Urban League of Essex County v.
Township of Mahwah, No. L-17112-71 (Law Div. Mar. 8, 1979 (township's bona fide efforts to
meet Mount Laurel obligation sufficient even though lowest new housing units in township were
priced at $70,000), rev'd sub nom. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d (1983); Caputo v. Township of Chester, No. L-42857-74
(Law Div. Oct. 4, 1978) (builder's remedy denied even after ordinance held unconstitutional),
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Mount Laurel II voiced the belief that there was "widespread noncompliance" with its original mandate, and expressed its determination to use a "strong judicial hand" to accomplish the Mount Laurel
goal of creating low and moderate income housing. 34 In so doing, the
Mount Laurel II court identified the SDGP, an executive agency
creation, as the proper standard by which to determine a municipality's Mount Laurel obligation. 35 Moreover, the court set up "administrative agencies" in the form of judicial panels to implement the
36
mandate.
4. Existing Land Use Law: A Hybrid of Judicial Substantive Law and
Legislative Procedural Law
The supreme court implied in Mount Laurel II that its decision
could operate within the procedural confines of the MLUL. 37 Nevertheless, the court then supplemented existing MLUL procedures by
creating a unique three judge super-zoning agency to hear Mount
Laurel II cases. 38 By giving the Mount Laurel II judges authority to
supersede exclusionary zoning action undertaken by municipalities
under the MLUL, the court overrode the legislature's confidence in
municipalities, at least with regard to exclusionary zoning cases.

aJf'd in part, rev'd inpart sub nom. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
11 Mt. Laurel I1,92 N.J. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
35 Id. at 225, 456 A.2d at 423-24. The court asserted that use of the SDGP in Mount Laurel
disputes would "ensure that the imposition of fair share obligations will coincide with the State's
regional planning goals and objectives." Id., 456 A.2d at 423; see supra note 17.
36 See Mt. Laurel I1,92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419. The court stated that:
Any future Mount Laurel litigation shall be assigned only to those judges
selected by the Chief Justice with the approval of the Supreme Court. The initial
group shall consist of three judges. the number to be increased or decreased hereafter
by the Chief Justice with the Court's approval. The Chief Justice shall define the
area of the State for which each of the three judges is responsible: any Mount Laurel
case challenging the land use ordinance of a municipality included in that area shall
be assigned to that judge.
Id. The Mount Laurel II court expressed the belief that a consistency in analyzing regional need
and in determining "fair share" obligations would result from the repeated use of the same
judges. Id. On June 2, 1983 the supreme court issued an order designating the three judges and
assigning each to a particular region. Each judge will be assigned any Mount Laurel case filed
within his region. See 111 N.J.L.J. 638 (June 16, 1983).
17 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 318-21, 456 A.2d at 472-74. The court reviewed excerpts
from the legislative history of the MLUL which indicated that the legislature's intent was to
create a procedural mechanism and that enactment of the MLUL "was not a legislative effort
aimed at creating balanced housing opportunities in New Jersey." Id.
38 Id. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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The mechanics of the zoning process under the MLUL are fairly
simple. The law provides that a municipality may establish a planning
board 39 which is empowered to create, after public hearings, a Master
Plan for the use of town lands. 40 This Master Plan, which must be
updated every six years, 4' must contain ten statutorily-described elements.

42

When the planning board completes its Master Plan recommendation, the final plan is forwarded to the municipal governing body,
which may then adopt an official map of the municipality. 43 The
official map "shall reflect the appropriate provisions of any municipal
master plan ' 44 submitted by the planning board, but the governing
body may reject any portion of that map by a majority vote. 4 5 Before
the official map can be adopted, the planning board has a statutory
4
right to respond to any proposed changes in the Master Plan . 6
This procedure establishes a six year blueprint for the development and growth of the municipality. The governing body must adopt47
or amend town zoning ordinances consistent with the Master Plan,
although zoning ordinances which are inconsistent with the plan may
also be adopted by a majority vote of the governing body. 48 The

39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-23(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). The planning board
would consist of seven or eight members to be chosen from four classes of individuals delineated
in the statute. Id.
40 Id. §§ 40:55D-25, -28.
41 Id. § 40:55D-89. The statute specifies that a report be prepared to enunciate the problems
and goals concerning land development which existed in the preceding reexamination time
period; the degree of change in those problems and objectives; the degree of change in the
underlying principles on which the master plan is based; and a recitation of recommendations
designed to meet the conditions found in the municipality at the time the report is made. Id.
42 Id. § 40:55D-28. The master plan serves as a standard of land use and should consist of
maps, diagrams, and text in order to convey the municipality's land use and development
scheme. Where appropriate, the plan must also include a recitation of the conceptual underpinnings of the plan; a land use plan element; a housing plan element; a circulation plan element; a
utility plan element; a community facilities plan element; a recreation plan element; a natural
resources conservation plan element; an energy conservation plan element, and a report outlining the technical foundation of the plan. Id.
43 Id. § 40:55D-32.
44

Id.

Id. If any portion of the map is rejected, however, reasons for so doing must be recorded in
the minutes of the meeting of the governing body at which the official map is adopted. Id.
46 Id. §§ 40:55D-32, -26.
47 Id. § 40:55D-62.
48 Id. As with the governing body's power to reject the proposed official map, ordinances
neither consistent with nor designed to effectuate the plan may be adopted, but the reasons for
adoption must be recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the governing body at which the
ordinance is adopted. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
41
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planning board is responsible for subdivision control and site plan
review, and the zoning board of adjustment is primarily responsible
4
for the granting of variances.

The two Mount Laurel decisions supplement this statutory zoning procedure by outlawing zoning which ignores a municipality's
duty to absorb its fair share of regional housing needs. Mount Laurel I
required that a municipality undertake a negative duty: to refrain
from engaging in exclusionary zoning practices. 50 Chief Justice Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme Court went further in Mount Laurel
II by imposing on municipalities an affirmative duty to take
action to assure that their fair share of low and moderate income
housing would be built. 5' Further, the court outlined specific judicial
remedies to be applied when a municipality fails to meet its affirma5
tive Mount Laurel II obligation.

2

Clearly, the affirmative duty imposed on municipalities by
Mount Laurel II has altered the task of municipal planning boards to
some degree. Similarly, the provision in the decision for judicial relief,
should the municipality fail to meet its obligation, alters the position
of those who may challenge a zoning ordinance. This article will
explore the implications of Mount Laurel II on all potential litigants,
particularly plantiff-builders.
II.

QUESTIONS A POTENTIAL MOUNT LAUREL LITIGANT SHOULD ASK

Whether the potential litigant is a municipality, a builder, or a
public interest group, it is essential for the party to determine whether
the municipality in question is subject to the Mount Laurel II obliga-

41 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-25, -37 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (powers of planning
board); id. § 40:55D-70, (powers of board of adjustment).
"oSee Mt. Laurel 1. 67 N.J. at 174-75. 336 A.2d at 724-25.
s Mt. Laurel II. 92 N.J. at 260-61, 456 A.2d at 442: see infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
52 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 278-90, 456 A.2d at 452-58. The judicial remedies include the
power of the trial court to order the revision of the challenged zoning ordinance within 90 days.
Id. at 281, 456 A.2d at 452. A master may also be appointed by the court to assist the
municipality in making the revisions. Id. If the revised ordinance fails to meet the Mount Laurel
requirements, the court may void the existing ordinances, or parts thereof, order the adoption of
specific ordinances, require the approval of applications to build certain projects, or order the
delay of construction projects in the municipality until the ordinances are satisfactorily revised.
Id. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455. The trial court may also determine that a developer is entitled to
a builder's remedy. Id. at 278-81, 456 A.2d at 452-53. See generally infra notes 93-114 and
accompanying text.
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tion and, if so, whether that obligation can realistically be fulfilled. In
order to do so, it is recommended that the litigant retain a qualified
planner who has had experience in state government or in Mount
Laurel litigation. Specifically, the planner should be asked the following questions:
A. What is the Impact of the SDGP Designation on this Municipality?
The SDGP designation for each county serves as the "blue print
for implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine.- 53 The Mount
Laurel II court substituted the SDGP standard of "growth areas" for
the "developing municipalities" standard that it had set forth in
Mount Laurel 1.54

The SDGP is not, however, conclusive as to a municipality's
Mount Laurel obligation. The court, recognizing that the SDGP was
neither intended nor accurately prepared for Mount Laurel uses,
provided grounds for challenging its validity. 55 If the litigant can show
that the SDGP designation for the municipality is "arbitrary and
capricious" or that the municipality "has undergone a significant
transformation that renders the SDGP's characterization of it inap56
propriate," the fair share obligation may be eliminated or modified.
The recent case of Orgo Farms & Greenhouses v. Colts Neck
Township5 provides the first post-Mount Laurel II judicial analysis of
the impact of the SDGP designation on the builder's remedy. In Orgo
Farms, Judge Serpentelli held that the builder's remedy is not restricted to a "growth area," but may, once the developer has satisfied
the prerequisites set forth in Mount Laurel II,5 be granted for land
59

located in an area designated a "limited growth area" on the SDGP.

3 Mt. Laurel II 92 N.J. at 226, 456 A.2d at 424; see supra note 17.
Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 240 n.15, 456 A.2d at 431 n.15.
5 Id. at 239-40, 456 A.2d at 431.
Id. at 240, 456 A.2d at 431-32. A third exception would apply if the SDGP concept map
was not revised by January 1, 1985. Id. A Mount Laurel obligation could be imposed by the trial
court if "subsequent to the date of this decision the municipality, containing no 'growth area,'
encourages or allows commercial, residential or industrial development or, if it contains some
.growth area,' encourages or allows development outside of that area." Id. at 240-41, 456 A.2d at
432.
51 192 N.J. Super. 599, 472 A.2d 812 (Law Div. 1983).
58 See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text for a discussion of these requirements.
59 Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. Super. at 606-07, 611, 471 A.2d at 815. The court
noted that the SDGP does not preclude the use of a limited growth area to accommodate growth
under all circumstances. Where the facts "may demonstrate that a builder's remedy would
comport with sound planning and have no negative environmental impact," it would be illogical
to conclude that such a remedy should not be available. Id. at 606, 471 A.2d at 815 (emphasis in
original).
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Any municipality or future Mount Laurel litigant must therefore
address the threshold issue of whether the SDGP designation for the
area in which the subject parcel is located may be challenged on any
of the grounds set forth by the Mount Laurel II court. 60 Further, if the
litigant is a developer, he may, on the basis of Orgo Farms, obtain a
builder's remedy despite the location of the proposed building site in a
limited growth area.6 ' These determinations should be made by the
litigant at the earliest possible stage, preferably prior to filing suit. At
least one of the three Mount Laurel judges has indicated that it is his
policy to hold bifurcated proceedings, thus isolating the issue of the
validity of the SDGP designation for separate trial at a very early
stage.62
B. What is the Role of State Agencies?
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Egg HarborAssociates
(Bayshore Centre),6 3 expanded the holding of Mount Laurel II by
giving state administrative agencies the power to require the construction of low and moderate income housing as a condition of the agency's approval of a proposed development. In Egg Harbor a developer
64
proposed a project which was to be located in the coastal region.
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had
jurisdiction under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act65 to review
and approve the project. The developer challenged the right of the
DEP to condition approval of the project upon the developer building
ten percent low income and ten percent moderate income housing
units. 66 The Egg Harbor court, in holding that state agencies, like
municipalities, may use their authority over land use to "create housing opportunities for the poor, "67 concluded that it would be illogical
"to hold that the general welfare encompasses the provision of low
and moderate income housing at the behest of municipalities, but not
of state agencies." 68

10
I"
62

See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59.
Comments of Judge Serpentelli at New Jersey State Bar Association Conference, "Litigat-

ing the Mount Laurel H1Case" (Dec. 3, 1983).
.3 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115 (1983).
14 Id. at 362, 464 A.2d at 1117.
15 N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
Egg Harbor, 94 N.J. at 364, 464 A.2d at 1118.
67 Id. at 367, 464 A.2d at 1119.
68 Id. Similarly, a recent application by a developer for a project in New Jersey's Meadowlands was subjected to the condition that the developer set aside 10% low income and 10%

966

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:955

The Egg Harbor decision raises the specter of municipalities
ceding zoning authority to state administrative agencies, and also
increases the possibility of conflicting decisions between state and
municipal land agencies.6 9 While no such conflict existed in the Egg
Harborcase, the supreme court, in dicta, suggested that any disputes
could be resolved by a cooperative effort on the part of the municipality and the state agency.70 Whether this cooperation will prove effective in resolving any conflicts that may arise remains to be seen. In
light of the Egg Harbor decision, however, it would be strongly
advisable for the litigating attorney to analyze the role of any interested state agency and, where appropriate, to consider joining that
agency as a party to any Mount Laurel litigation.
C. What is the Role of Other Parties Having a Vested Interest
in the Outcome of this Suit?
Any potential Mount Laurel litigant must assess the positions of
others who are likely to claim an interest in the suit. Pending lawsuits
demonstrate that municipalities, organizations, or individuals who
were not originally joined in the litigation are often affected. For
example, one pending case began with a single developer suing the
Borough of Norwood because his application for permission to subdivide a 151-acre undeveloped site had been denied. 7t After Mount

moderate income housing. This condition was imposed by the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HMDC), a state agency. The HMDC imposed the 10/10 fair share requirement in compliance with Mount Laurel 11 but subsequently asked the State Attorney General for
guidelines regarding the percentage of housing to be set aside for low and moderate income
housing. See Lynn, Low-Income Units Likely in Hartz Project, The Record, Nov. 13, 1983, at A52, col. 2.
69 Egg Harbor, 94 N.J. at 370, 464 A.2d at 1121. The potential for conflict did not go
unnoticed by the court: -As a theoretical proposition, the legislative scheme leaves open the
possibility for conflicting decisions from DEP and municipal land use agencies in the coastal
zone." Id. The court found no such conflict on the issues presented to it. Id.
70 Id. at 370-71, 464 A.2d at 1121. The court noted that:
Any problems arising in future applications may be alleviated if,as is the
practice of DEP, staff members meet with the applicant and municipal officials to
discuss the effect of development on the municipality's obligation to meet its fair
share of low and moderate income housing. In an appropriate case, DEP might even
provide testimony in municipal proceedings on the provision of low and moderate
income housing. Presumably, as here, municipal officials may also appear at public
hearings conducted by DEP. If problems should develop because of the overlapping
jurisdiction of the municipality and DEP, the Legislature can resolve the conflict
through amendments to the statutory scheme.
Id.
71 Kuhn, Town Faces $25,000 Bill in Lawsuits on Housing, The Record, June 30, 1983, at B3, col. 5.
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Laurel II was decided, the developer converted the case to a Mount
Laurel action. Thereafter, the floodgates opened for litigants: Another developer joined the suit and sent a notice to all towns in the
area that the decision in the case might affect their "fair share"
obligation. 72 Eleven of these towns were granted permission to intervene in the suit on the side of Norwood. 73 Unlike the other towns,
however, Englewood sided with the developer, alleging that Norwood's refusal to bear its fair share was depriving Englewood residents of an opportunity to obtain low and moderate income housing
in Norwood.7 4 Thereafter, Norwood counterclaimed against Englewood, alleging that Englewood was not bearing its fair share. 75 Thus,
within a six month period, a suit initially involving one developer and
one town had mushroomed into one involving an army of litigants,
counsel, and experts.
The suit in Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton
Township 76 began with the joining of twenty-five municipalities as
77
defendants, some of which were located in "limited growth areas,
and therefore may not have had a fair share obligation. After the
Mount Laurel II decision, the Public Advocate offered to permit those
towns to withdraw from the suit. 78 Even though accepting the offer of
withdrawal would have saved each of those towns their share of the
substantial expenses for legal and expert witness costs, most of the
towns, fearing that they could be adversely affected by the decision in
an action to which they were not parties, rejected the Public Advocate's offer for dismissal. 79 The stalemate was eventually broken when

72 Kuhn, Norwood Rejects Mount Laurel Pact; 2nd Suit Filed, The Record, Sept. 16, 1983,
at D-3, col. 1. The second suit was filed by a developer who proposed to build a 144-unit garden
apartment complex on a nine-acre site in Norwood. At least 10% of the apartment units were
targeted for low and moderate income families. Id.
7' Kuhn, 11 Bergen Towns Join Suit Against Norwood Zoning, The Sunday Record, Sept.
18, 1983, at A-53, col. 1. The 11 towns intervening in the suit were Hillsdale, Teaneck,
Bergenfield, Allendale, Closter, Englewood Cliffs, Cresskill, Northvale, Rockleigh, Harrington
Park, and Englewood. Id.
74Id.
75Kuhn, Norwood Zoning Rules Struck Down, The Record, Dec. 14, 1983, at A-47, col. 1.
Although Norwood's ordinances were struck down in December 1983, no decision has yet been
rendered in the Englewood-Norwood controversy. Id.
71 Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Township, No. L-6001-78 PW (Law Div.
Morris County filed Oct. 13, 1978).
77 Id.

78 Id.

79 Id.
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Judge Skillman agreed to permit the towns to withdraw on the condition that they would not be bound by his decision in the continuing
case. 80
The Boonton Township and Norwood cases demonstrate that any
Mount Laurel suit can become extremely complicated, simply because
there are so many parties that may have an interest in the outcome.
Another case which illustrates the full range of potential litigants that
may join a Mount Laurel suit is Home Builders League of South
Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin. 81 In that case the plaintiffs consisted of three private builders, a trade association (Home Builders),
82
the Public Advocate, and the South Jersey Tenants Association.
Defendants, consisting of four municipalities, challenged the plaintiffs' standing. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that all the plainoutcome of
tiffs had standing based on their substantial interest in8 the
3
defendants.
the
to
position
adverse
their
and
case
the
A Mount Laurel litigant must therefore anticipate the possibility
of participation not only by builders and municipalities, but by public
interest, civic, and trade associations as well. Additionally, the litigant should consider actively soliciting participation by those groups
in order to reduce legal fees, minimize surprise by identifying his
adversaries at an early point in the litigation, and strengthen his
bargaining position for settlement.
D. What Are the Infrastructure Requirements and Costs?
A potential Mount Laurel II litigant must assess the impact of
utility costs to the community if the low and moderate income housing
is constructed. The major costs to be evaluated are those for water
supply, sewer systems, and garbage disposal. A developer presenting a
Mount Laurel density bonus proposal seeking builder's remedy relief
must include a detailed analysis of infrastructure cost and impact on
the community as part of his development proposal. New Jersey's

80 Id.

81 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979).
82 Id. at 130-31, 405 A.2d at 383.
83 Id. at 131-35, 405 A.2d at 383-85. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' standing
should be evaluated under the criteria for standing in federal courts as set out in Warth v. Seldin,
429 U.S. 252 (1975). Berlin, 81 N.J. at 131, 405 A.2d at 383. The court rejected this argument,
noting that under Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d
433 (1971), the New Jersey standing requirements are less stringent than the federal. Berlin, 81
N.J. at 132, 405 A.2d at 384.
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Environmental Protection Commissioner has stated that the state
must establish a means of financing new water and sewer systems and
other elements of the infrastructure before any comprehensive housing
plan can be put into effect.8 4 In the town of Mahwah, one of the
defendant municipalities in Mount Laurel II, public controversy has
arisen over the issue of how the town will raise the revenue necessary
to cover the cost of new sewer lines to service its mandated Mount
8
Laurel II housing.

5

These recent developments highlight the need for towns and
developers to evaluate the costs of infrastructure items as part of the
fair share housing proposal. If the issue cannot be resolved voluntarily, it should be presented for judicial determination. If the town has a
municipal utility authority or if the infrastructure item is governed by
a state or county administrative agency, the developer should join the
appropriate utility agency or authority as a defendant in the lawsuit.
In addition, litigants should note that the Mount Laurel II court, in
denying a builder's remedy, took into account the municipality's lack
86
of a developed infrastructure.
E. Can the Proposed Low and Moderate Income Housing Be Built?
Although Chief Justice Wilentz, in Mount Laurel II, stated that
the court's goal was to facilitate the building of houses through the
enforcement of the New Jersey Constitution, he later pointed out that
"actual construction . .. will continue to depend, in a much larger

degree, on the economy, on private enterprise and on the actions of
other branches of government at the national, state and local level." 8 7
While the opinion provides the legal mechanism to achieve this goal,
it is notably devoid of any specific, detailed analysis of the economic
reality of building low and moderate income housing. In its lengthy
opinion, the court failed to mention a number of factors which are
crucial to the issue of whether a private developer can internally
subsidize development of the low and moderate income housing for a
particular project: (1) the cost of land, construction, site improvements and infrastructure elements;88 (2) the marketing impact of

84 State Spurns Court On Suggestion To Revise Housing Guide Plan-Official Calls It
No
Basis For Zoning Policy. The Star-Ledger, Oct. 19. 1983. at 10, col. 1.
Mahwah Delays Vote On Sewer Authority. The Record. Nov. 18, 1983, at D-3, col. 4.
Mt. Laurel I1,92 N.J. at 316, 456 A.2d at 472.
8 Id. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.

88 See CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH,
Low-COST HouSING
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joining the construction of low and moderate income housing with the
higher priced housing in the project; and (3) the aesthetic impact of
the housing mix.
Perhaps the ultimate question arising from the Mount Laurel II
decision is whether the builder can still earn a satisfactory profit once
given the "opportunity" to build low and moderate income housing.
One of the basic premises of Mount Laurel II is that a builder can
construct and sell without profit a certain percentage of low and
moderate income housing (for example, twenty percent) and then
realize his gain on the sale of the remaining units.8 9 There is considerable builder concern in the more prosperous areas of the state that their
basic costs will prevent them from earning a fair return on a project in
which they are required to build low and moderate income housing.
If it is true that a builder cannot earn a satisfactory profit by the
construction of low and moderate income housing in "growth designated communities," it may then become economically impossible for
a municipality to meet its fair share obligation. This will require the
court to permit, as a last resort, the construction of "least cost" housing.90 Certainly, the scarcity of available housing construction subsidies on the federal and state levels 1 deprives the courts and the
building industry of one means of encouraging the construction of
affordable housing. This economic reality is a threshold issue in any
Mount Laurel II case because it may make the builder's remedies
illusory. As the Mount Laurel II court noted: "If builder's remedies
cannot be profitable, the incentive for builders to enforce Mount
92
Laurel is lost."
Therefore, any developer who seeks a builder's remedy must
analyze the economic factors of his project before he presents a proposal. This will require a comprehensive cost analysis as well as
financial, accounting, and tax advice. Further, if the issue is raised in
an eventual suit, it may be necessary for the court to retain a financial
master to resolve these aspects of the proposal so that the homes can be

four components of housing cost are outlined: (1) development costs (land, interim financing,
public fee, and other soft costs); (2) construction costs (unit construction and improvements); (3)
delivery costs (contingency, overhead, and profit); and (4) occupancy costs (principal and
interest for purchase money loan, property taxes, maintenance, and insurance). Id. at 318-19.
19 Mt. Laurel II,92 N.J. at 267-74 & n.30, 456 A.2d at 446-50 & n.30.
10 See supra note 29.
I" See RUTGERS REPoRT, supra note 88, at 86.
92 Mt. Laurel I, 92 N.J. at 279 n.37, 456 A.2d at 452 n.37.
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built. The financial master may require that the planning master
modify and coordinate his recommendation with cost factors so that a
comprehensive, workable builder's remedy can be awarded to the
developer of the project.
III.

MOUNT LAUREL

II PROCEDURE

Mount Laurel II establishes a procedure by which a plaintiff can
obtain a judicial remedy in response to a municipality's failure to
provide an opportunity for the construction of low and moderate
income housing. This procedure begins when a plaintiff files suit
alleging that a municipality located in a SDGP growth area has failed
to satisfy its Mount Laurel obligation. 93 The case will then be assigned
to one of the three Mount Laurel judges. 94 If the judge determines that
a defendant has not met its Mount Laurel obligation, he can either
order the municipality to amend its zoning ordinance within ninety
days, or issue a builder's remedy. 95 Only after the town has complied
96
with the trial court's order will it be permitted to appeal.
The trial judge may also appoint a special master to assist the
municipality in revising its zoning ordinance.9 7 This appointment is
not a punitive measure; rather, since the master should be a knowledgeable zoning expert, his appointment provides a means for the
court to free itself from overinvolvement in the intricacies of zoning
law.98 Irrespective of whether or not the court appoints a special

I' at 278-81. 456 A.2d at 452-53.
Id.
Id. at 216-17, 456 A.2d at 419. The court reasoned that assigning all Mount Laurel
litigation to a limited number of judges would generate the consistency and predictability needed
in order to give the doctrine its full effect. Id. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
At a recent conference, the Mount Laurel judges indicated that they have adopted a
procedure which entails early and frequent conferences with the litigants. The judges hope that
these conferences xwill lead to settlements before trial, since the equitable issues arising in Mount
Laurel cases are especially suited for early disposition. Comments of Judge Serpentelli at New
Jersey State Bar Association Conference, "Litigating the Mount Laurel II Case" (Dec. 3, 1983);
see Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 292-93, 456 A.2d at 459.
95 Mt. Laurel H1,92 N.J. at 278-85, 456 A.2d at 452-55.
98 Id. at 290, 456 A.2d at 458. The court adopted this position because it wished to prevent
municipalities from delaying implementation of Mount Laurel relief through the institution of
lengthy appeals. See id. But cf. id. at 290-91, 456 A.2d at 458 (stay can be granted by either trial
or appellate court in extreme circumstances).
"I Id. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453.
I' Id. at 283-84, 456 A.2d at 454. Chief Justice Wilentz envisioned the master as:
an expert, a negotiator, a mediator, and a catalyst-a person who will help the
municipality select from the innumerable combinations of actions that could satisfy
the constitutional obligation, the one that gives appropriate weight to the many
94
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master, however, it may implement a variety of remedies if the municipality refuses to amend its ordinances within the time allotted. 99
A builder's remedy is the court-ordered issuance of a building
permit to a plaintiff-developer who has successfully challenged a municipal zoning ordinance on Mount Laurel grounds. 00 The remedy is
issued provided: (1) the builder has proposed a substantial amount of
low income housing; and (2) the impact of the proposal on the environment, "or other substantial planning concerns," will not clearly be
contrary to sound land use planning.' 0 '
If a developer successfully challenges a zoning ordinance, a specific builder's remedy must be formulated. There are several problems, however, that the court will face in designing a suitable build-

conflicting interests involved, the one that satisfies not only the Constitution but, to
some extent, the parties as well.
Id.at 283, 456 A.2d at 454.
Id. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455-56. The court may order:
(1) that the municipality adopt such resolutions and ordinances, including
particular amendments to its zoning ordinance, and other land use regulations, as
will enable it to meet its Mount Laurel obligations:
(2) that certain types of projects or construction as may be specified by the trial
court be delayed within the municipality until its ordinance is satisfactorily revised,
or until all or part of its fair share of lower income housing is constructed and/or firm
commitments for its construction have been made by responsible developers;
(3) that the zoning ordinance and other land use regulations of the municipality
be deemed void in whole or in part so as to relax or eliminate building and use
restrictions in all or selected portions of the municipality (the court may condition
this remedy upon failure of the municipality to adopt resolutions or ordinances
mentioned in (1) above); and
(4) that particular applications to construct housing that includes lower income
units be approved by the municipality, or any officer, board, agency, authority'
(independent or otherwise) or division thereof.
Id., 456 A.2d at 455.
I See id. at 279-81, 456 A.2d at 452. The court summarized the arguments for and against a
builder's remedy as follows:
Plaintiffs, particularly plaintiff-developers, maintain that these remedies are (i)
essential to maintain a significant level of Mount Laurel litigation, and the only
effective method to date of enforcing compliance: (ii) required by principles of
fairness to compensate developers who have invested substantial time and resources
in pursuing such litigation; and (iii) the most likely means of ensuring that lower
income housing is actually built. Defendant municipalities contend that even if a
plaintiff-developer obtains a judgment that a particular municipality has not complied with Mount Laurel, that municipality, and not the developer, should be
allowed to determine how and where its fair share obligation will be met.
Id. at 279, 456 A.2d at 452.
I0, Id. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452-53. These issues are understandably not addressed until the
trial court determines that the town's zoning ordinance violates the Mount Laurel doctrine. The
supreme court also noted a third issue that will act as a potential precondition to the granting of a
builder's remedy: A developer who attempts to use the builder's remedy as an "unintended
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er's remedy. For example, a problem could arise from the impact of a
sudden surge in construction in a single municipality. 0 2 Chief Justice
Wilentz, in Mount Laurel 11, suggested that one solution to this
problem would be for trial courts to require the builder to phase in the
development over time.'0 3 The court, however, did not resolve several
other potential problems.
For instance, one issue that has developed concerns the extent to
which a builder must pursue municipal administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Mount Laurel II court stated in a footnote that
the builder need not exhaust such remedies because zoning and planning boards have no authority to decide constitutional issues. 04 The
court, however, also indicated that some attempt to obtain relief
without litigation should ordinarily precede the grant of a builder's
remedy. 0 5 Thus, the nature and extent of the extrajudicial efforts
required prior to the institution of suit remains an open question, and
one that must be resolved. In two pending cases, for example, municipalities have raised the defense that the developers' complaints should
be dismissed for failure to apply for a variance. 106
At this early stage in the implementation of Mount Laurel II,
there is merit to the court's short-circuiting of municipal administrative procedure since it ensures prompt resolution of the regional fair

bargaining chip- in negotiations with the municipality will be barred from pursuing or continu
ing the Mount Laurel litigation. 1d. at 280, 456 A.2d at 452. This latter issue should be dealt
with early in the litigation-perhaps upon filing of the pleadings-since the builder's good faith
is a threshold issue.
102 Id., 456 A.2d at 452-53. The court feared that indiscriminately timed builder's remedies
would "cause a sudden and radical transformation of the municipality." Id., 456 A.2d at 453.
103 Id. at 218-19, 280, 456 A.2d at 420-21, 452-53.
104 Id. at 342 n.73, 456 A.2d at 485 n.73.
105 Id. at 218, 456 A.2d at 420. The court stated that, subject to sound zoning and planning
concepts and the inclusion of an appropriate number of low and moderate income units,
builder's remedies would be afforded "[w]here the plaintiff has acted in good faith, attempted to
obtain relief without litigation, and thereafter vindicates the constitutional obligation in Mount
Laurel-type litigation ..
." Id.
106Norwood Easthill Assocs. v. Borough of Norwood, No. L-057028-83 (Law Div. Bergen
County, filed Nov. 28, 1983) (four actions consolidated); Alfred A. Cullere v. Booueh of
Ramsey, No. L-077499-83 (Law Div. Bergen County filed D
3).
e'l
e emunicipality's decision to grant a variance would not in every case depend upon
a constitutional determination, the question remains whether the municipality should be afforded the opportunity to avoid litigation through the granting of relief on other than constitutional grounds. In those cases in which the municipality decides that there are nonconstitutional
bases for relief, the constitutional issue will have been preserved for presentation to the court.
Thus, although the court apparently will not require the exhaustion of nonjudicial remedies, it
remains to be determined what administrative steps must be taken prior to filing suit.
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share issue. As Mount Laurel II litigation matures, however, the court
expects the determination of regional fair share to be reduced to a
conclusive mechanical formula, 0 7 thus enabling the courts to focus
their attention on the builder's remedy. At that point, the need to
determine the constitutionality of local zoning ordinances will be less
urgent. The court may then wish to revive the practice of requiring
the builder to exhaust his administrative remedies under the MLUL
before he can file a Mount Laurel II suit seeking a builder's remedy.
This would enable the court to have the input of the municipal
agencies before the action is filed so it can focus on resolving the issues
involved in designing the builder's remedy.
Another problem may arise if there is more than one builder
involved in the litigation. If together they have requested more than
the municipality's fair share allocation, the court must decide what
proportion of the remedy should be awarded to each builder. The
court may elect to award the remedy on the basis of priority of filing
of the complaint. A preferable solution is to adopt the best land
utilization proposal to consume the town's fair share allocation, as this
would assure the most appropriate sites for construction.
In addition, a problem could arise from the court's emphasis on
cost savings to produce low-priced housing. 0 8 The abolition of costproducing anti-look-alike ordinances and construction code requirements could result in shoddy, unattractive housing which, in the long
run, could lead to future slums. 0 9 The builder's remedy, once given,
irrevocably consumes a portion of the municipality's fair share obligation. It therefore should be awarded only where it can produce qual-

107 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.

01o
See, e.g., id. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451-52 (discussion of "least cost" housing).
As one author has observed:

109

Anti look-alike ordinances are designed to provide more attractive housing through a
variety of styles. Breaks in multi-family units preclude a barracks-like appearance.
Without these provisions developers will construct future slums.
Air conditioning is a necessity in New Jersey during our hot, muggy summers.
Poor people also sweat, and those that physically toil are entitled to a cool respite
during the night. Money could be saved in the short run if all amenities were
excluded, but shoddy housing would be created. The Court cannot allow a denigration of construction standards, in order to initially save a small amount of money,
where it will cost more in the long run. American industry has been ravaged by a
fixation with short term profits. Hopefully the courts will not fall into the same trap.
Bernstein, Why Mount Laurel Won't Work .. . Unless, 112 N.J.L.J. 413, 414 (1983).
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ity low and moderate income housing that harmonizes with the community need to produce a suitable housing development.
The Mount Laurel II court strongly suggested that municipal
planning boards should be "closely involved in the formulation of the
builder's remedy."' '1 The court failed to recognize, however, that the
involvement of municipal planning boards will expand their duties
beyond those delegated under the MLUL."' Further, since planning
board members hold part-time political positions, most of which are
filled by mayoral appointment, it is questionable whether they are the
appropriate parties to help formulate the builder's remedy. It seems
unlikely that part-time political appointees will have the experience in
budgeting, in allocating funds, or in hiring the proper personnel to
meet the responsibilities involved in creating a builder's remedy.
When faced with the complexity of the developer's plan, the conciliatory efforts of the master, and the pressure of the same court that
declared their zoning ordinance invalid, the planning board members
2
may be overwhelmed or intimidated."
At the builder's remedy stage, the joint duty of the developer and
the municipality is to produce an agreement which will bring about
the construction of a substantial amount of low and moderate income
housing. The performance of this duty by both parties requires that
they use their skills, ingenuity, and experience to create a customdesigned builder's remedy for the particular case. This requires familiarity with the full panoply of incentives recited in the Mount Laurel
II opinion: mandatory set-asides, zoning for low cost mobile or modular homes, elimination of cost-producing requirements and restrictions, obtaining federal and state subsidies to reduce development
costs, the granting of tax abatements and density bonuses," 3 as well as
other incentive devices." 4 Although the developer and the town are

Mt. Laurel I. 92 N.J. at 280. 456 A.2d at 453.
See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
112 Itshould also be noted that since the planning board consists of mayoral appointees, in a
town with a bipartisan municipal government, the members of the planning board could reflect
the minority party's views rather than those of the majority. It would seem that the governing
body of the municipality, which is already a party to the suit, is directly responsible to the voters,
and has significant experience in budgetary matters, is the appropriate municipal agency to
create a builder's remedy suitable for the community.
13 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 258-77, 456 A.2d at 441-51.
114 See Bozung, A Positive Response to Growth Control Plans: The Orange County Inclusionary Housing Program. 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 819 (1982) (discussing various inclusionary
zoning techniques).
"o
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adversaries in the litigation, cooperation between them is imperative
if a workable builder's remedy is to be produced.
In selecting an appropriate building subsidy, a conflict may arise
if the builder proposes that the municipality bear some of the costs.
The town may assert that it should not be forced to pass on the costs to
its taxpayers, but rather that the builder should assume these costs and
transfer them to those buyers who purchase the higher income housing
in the development. The parties should be prepared to compromise in
order to avoid time-consuming arguments, and should keep in mind
that the purpose of the builder's remedy is to ensure that a substantial
amount of affordable low cost housing is produced.
While a full review of the various forms of builder's remedies is
beyond the scope of this article, it is apparent that the granting of a
builder's remedy is critical to the successful implementation of the
Mount Laurel II doctrine. Success is measured by the construction of
affordable low cost housing, and such housing cannot be built unless
the court approves a suitable builder's remedy. The builder should
develop his remedy proposal at an early stage-preferably before the
suit is filed-so that his experts are fully prepared at any stage of the
litigation to present the plan to the court or master. The builder
should be prepared to prove that he needs specific incentives in order
to afford to build the project, and should be prepared to raise objections to obstructive municipal planning or zoning requirements.
Given the anticipated difficulty that the municipal planning board
will have with this type of proposal, it is important that the builder
present a clear plan. Ultimately, if the parties are unable to agree on a
mutually acceptable remedy, the court will have to settle the dispute.
IV.

SALE AND RESALE RESTRICTIONS ON

Lowm

INCOME UNITS

Once a municipality's fair share obligation has been determined,
it is responsible both for presently meeting that obligation, and for
ensuring that the obligation continues to be met in the future.1 15 The
Mount Laurel II court set forth a number of means by which zoning
could be used by a municipality to meet its current fair share obligation." 6 At a minimum, the municipality "must remove all municipally created barriers to the construction of their fair share of lower

"' Implicit in the Mount Laurel mandate is a duty to ensure that low cost housing is
maintained as such, so that the municipality continues to meet its "fair share" obligation. See Mt.
Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447.
. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
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income housing. "" 7 The court interpreted this to mean that a municipality may retain only those zoning restrictions that are necessary to
safeguard the public health and safety." 8 Should the removal of zoning restrictions prove insufficient to create a "realistic opportunity"
for the town's fair share of lower income housing to be built, however,
the municipality would have to take affirmative actions to help bring
about that result." 9
The court mentioned two types of affirmative zoning measures
20
that might be used: incentive zoning and the mandatory set-aside.
Incentive zoning programs encourage developers to construct low
income housing either by easing density restrictions as more housing is
built, or by giving builders a set bonus for erecting low income
units.' 2 ' These measures are generally ineffective because, as the court
noted, they permit developers to forego the incentive. 22 Mandatory
set-asides, which require that a certain percentage of development be
devoted to low and moderate income housing, were viewed by the
court as more likely to produce the desired results. 23 The Mount
Laurel II court held that should these affirmative measures fail, the
municipality must then zone to accommodate low cost mobile
homes. 24 As a last resort, after removing all restrictive zoning and
attempting all the affirmative measures described above, a municipal-

Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 258-59, 456 A.2d at 441.
Id. at 259, 456 A.2d at 441. For a discussion of the relationship of zoning restrictions to
public health and safety, see generally F. CHAPIN & E. KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNINc 4850 (3d ed. 1979); Williams, Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead
Lake Revisited, 3 Wis. L. REV. 827, 835-36 (1969). For a critical appraisal of the problems
inherent in determining when zoning restrictions are excessive, and thus "barriers" to the
expansion of low cost housing, see Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning,
17

118

14 SEON HALL L. REV. 851, 874-76 (1984).
'1 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 261, 456 A.2d at 442. The court, noting that ordinances which
merely permit the construction of low income housing do not often result in the actual building
of such developments, emphasized that trial courts should examine the "realities of the situation." Id. at 261 n.26, 456 A.2d at 443 n.26.
120 Id. at 265-74, 456 A.2d at 445-50. The court also noted that other techniques, such
as
zoning for lower cost mobile homes, establishing zones with maximum square footage restrictions, and overzoning, could be employed to assist municipalities in providing their fair share of
low income housing. Id. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447.
121 Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
122 Id. at 266-67, 456 A.2d at 445-46 (citing Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide

Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINCS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1067 (1976) (concluding that

"[d]evelopers are reluctant to cooperate with voluntary programs because of uncertainty about
the profitability of the density bonus")).
121 Id. at 267, 456 A.2d at 446.
12
Id. at 275, 456 A.2d at 450.
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ity may meet its Mount Laurel obligation by providing "least cost"
housing. 125 All of these measures, however, deal only with the initial
problem of providing for low income housing in the local zoning
scheme. Once that housing has been built, the municipality has a duty
to ensure that it is, and continues to be, made available to low income
persons. 126
For example, if a developer builds housing units intended for low
income purchasers but does not actually sell them to such buyers, the
town will have failed to meet its fair share obligation. Similarly, there
must be some mechanism to prevent the future resale or rerental of
low income units to nonqualified persons in order to avoid the gradual
erosion of the number of units in the municipality devoted to low
income housing. These problems were given scant attention in the
Mount Laurel II opinion, yet their solution is essential to the court's
goal of continued availability of low cost housing in all growth communities.
The court recognized these problems in the context of mandatory
set-aside programs, stating that "[b]ecause [such a] program usually
requires a developer to sell or rent units at below their full value so
that the units can be affordable to lower income people, the owner of
the development or the initial tenant or purchaser of the unit may be
induced to re-rent or re-sell the unit at its full value."'' 27 Chief Justice
Wilentz, characterizing it as a problem "which municipalities must
address,'

' 28

then briefly discussed a number of possible solutions.

The simplest method mentioned by the court would be for the
builder to construct "lower cost" housing 29 that could be sold to low
income purchasers at a price close to market value, thus eliminating
the opportunity for the builder or the initial purchaser to profit by
selling to higher income persons. 3 ° The court noted that a more
common approach is for the town to require that the prices be maintained at lower income levels, and cited the Cherry Hill and Franklin
Township zoning ordinances as examples.' 3 ' As the Mount Laurel I]

Id. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451; see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447.
121 Id.; see Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to ProvideLow and Moderate Cost Housing, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1035 (1976); Rose, The Mount Laurel II Decision: Is It Based on
Wishful Thinking?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 134-35 (1983).
121 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447 (emphasis in original).
129 The court cited mobile homes and "no-frills"
apartments as examples of "lower cost"
housing. Id.
130 See id.
13' Id. The Cherry Hill ordinance calls for " 'regulations which reasonably assure that
the
dwelling units be occupied by [lower income persons].' " Id. The Franklin Township ordinance
25

121
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court observed, such ordinances apparently make it the developer's
responsibility "to devise the precise mechanism for maintaining the
units at lower income levels.' 32 The court thus views the municipality
as an enforcer of specific regulations created by the developer.
Another mechanism for enforcing a lower income restriction,
which had been considered by Princeton Township, was reviewed
with approval by the court:
First, disposition covenants would have been created for all the
lower income units binding the owners and renters of such units to
sell or rent only at lower income levels. Second, a Public Trust
would have been created whose trustees would have administered
the covenants and
determined what would be "lower income lev33
els" over time.

The disposition covenants would presumably be drafted by the developer, and it would seem appropriate that at least one of the trustees of
the Public Trust would be the municipality. Since the court offered no
guidance as to the creation or administration of this two-part control
mechanism, however, further discussion is warranted.
Certainly, any builder planning to put restrictive disposition covenants in the deeds for lower income units must obtain title company
review and approval. The title company will be concerned with the
procedure for enforcement of the covenant and the documentation
which will be required to certify compliance with the restriction so
that it can be removed as a title exception. The restriction also must be
drafted to include specific provisions for resale or rerental of the unit
by a mortgagee in foreclosure. If this is not done, the unit may not be
mortgageable. As noted in a recent study:
Affordability monitoring entails possible conflict with lender
interests. Lenders desire unfettered appreciation of mortgaged
properties so as to better protect their security. An inclusionary
program cap on the future sales/rental price does not allow this.
Important mortgage institutions such as FNMA and FHLMC have
indicated their unease with affordability controls which cloud their
interest. Both have issued regulations indicating they would not
deal in mortgages that carry deed restrictions subordinated (upon

goes one step further and requires the developer to "demonstrate in writing that the rentals and
prices of lower income units remain low enough to benefit lower income persons." Id.
132

Id.

133 Id.

at 269-70, 456 A.2d at 447.
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foreclosure) to other designees, such as a housing authority-a not
34
uncommon inclusionary program combination.
Since most lenders are engaged in packaging mortgages for sale either
to the Federal National Mortgage Association or to other governmental mortgage agencies, the builder, with the lender's assistance, should
seek the intended governmental mortgage purchase agency's approval
of the deed restriction before it is used.
The functioning of the Public Trust, the second part of the
proposed Princeton Township control mechanism noted by the Mount
Laurel II court, presents different problems. A recent study offers the
following analysis:
In addition to the mechanics, there is also the question of who
will administer and pay for enforcement of the affordability controls. Possible candidates include the developer, a local housing
authority, municipal planning department, or a homeowner's association. Such assumption would ultimately entail hundreds of separate entities doing the monitoring. Besides the diseconomies involved in this approach, there is the further question of
permanence (e.g., what happens when a builder goes bankrupt or
a housing authority disbands?). Monitoring by one or a limited
number of players is called for. The State Department of Community Affairs is a leading candidate. Its involvement in this matter
would provide a needed central authority. It would also enable the
state to monitor the progress of meeting the Mount Laurel mandate
35
and to see first-hand which bridge strategies are most promising.
It is clear that once a builder has sold the units, he has no vested
interest in the future administration of the project. The only interested
parties at that point are the municipality, because of its duty to see
that its fair share obligation continues to be met; the state, acting in
the public interest to preserve affordable housing for low income
citizens; and the residents of the project itself.
The roles of these parties favors the creation of a Public Trust in
the form of a nonprofit corporation, organized by the builder at the
inception of the project, with membership consisting of the builder,
the municipality, and the state, 3 6 all having a one-third vote. As units

"I RUTGERs

REPORT, supra note 88, at 356.
Id. at 356-57 (emphasis in original).
36 The state could be represented by either the New Jersey Public Advocate or some other
municipal agency created in the future.

,
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are sold, the builder's interest would diminish until it is entirely
replaced by the board of unit owners. The plan will have to be drafted
so that the separate interests of both the low and higher income
purchasers are compatible. If the project is being built pursuant to a
builder's remedy, the court awarding the remedy may also retain
jurisdiction for the limited purpose of resolving a dispute if the board
cannot reach agreement on an application for resale of a unit. In
addition, an appeal procedure would have to be created so that the
low income residents seeking resale could challenge the denial, or
unfavorable terms of approval, of their resale applications.
Finally, it may be necessary for the board of directors of the
project to have a right of first refusal to repurchase at the original
price, coupled with a further first option of purchase for other unit
37
owners in the project who can satisfy the lower income standards.1
This would permit the owner of another unit who had purchased at
the market price, and who has since sustained a reduction in income, 13 to remain in the development by the sale or rental of his
existing unit, and purchase of the lower income unit at the lower
price. Courts will have to explore the resale issue carefully in order to
create equitable preemptive purchase rights.
There still remains, however, the problem of the selection and
monitoring of the initial low income purchaser. The Mount Laurel II
court's failure to address this issue specifically raises some serious
questions. As one commentator has noted:
Who will implement the set aside? May the developer choose the
low and moderate income individuals, who, although, bona fide
low income individuals, may be his friends? May it be an organization such as the Urban League, the Sons of Italy, the Society for the

131 See RUTGERS REPORT, supra note 88, at 388. The Town of East Brunswick has adopted an
ordinance permitting the town to purchase low income units on these terms when such units are
offered for resale. Id. A number of New Jersey municipalities have enacted inclusionary programs which include affordability controls of this type. Id. at 385-87.
In the past, condominiums could be subject to similar resale controls, but recent legislation
has prohibited condominium boards from imposing restrictions on resale of a condominium unit.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-36 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (establishing presumption of
unconscionability for any condominium master deed or by-law recorded prior to Sept. 11, 1980
containing a right of first refusal to buy a condominium unit upon resale, gift, or devise by the
owner); id. § 46:8B-38 (prohibiting such clauses in condominium deeds or by-laws recorded after
1980).
131 For example, a reduction in income could occur because of the death of a spouse, retirement, or change of job.
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Absorption of Soviet Emigres, a church, or must the poor people be
chosen randomly, in keeping with the gambling mentality in the
39
Garden State that encourages lottery and casino gambling?1
Another problem will occur if, after the initial purchase, the lower
income buyer has a change in financial status. 40 Suppose that a
purchaser inherits wealth, wins the lottery, or receives a substantial
raise in salary. Can he continue to reside in the lower income unit,
and if so, under what terms? Do purchasers of other units at full
market value then have any rights against the town or the low income
unit occupant? Does the change in the financial status of the lower
income resident remove that unit from the town's fair share obligation
and require replacement of the unit?' 4' These inquiries indicate the
need for post-sale monitoring of the income of the initial purchaser to
prevent lower income housing from becoming a windfall for the
undeserving.
Although the court was silent on this issue, the Public Trust
device seems to lend itself to solving the problem of selecting the initial
purchaser as well as to monitoring the resale or rerental of low income
units. This mechanism could, as discussed earlier, take the form of a
nonprofit corporation, and at this stage, it would determine the eligibility of prospective buyers and would assign the low income units to
those who qualify. A good example of the mechanics of this can be
drawn from the unreported case of Allen Dean Corp. & Lynn
Ceiswick v. Township of Bedminster, 42 in which the builder organized a nonprofit corporation consisting of representatives of the
builder, the town, and the New Jersey Department of the Public

Advocate.

131

143

Bernstein, mupra note 109, at 414. The author also noted:
Just as federal subsidies have produced improprieties, I fear that internal subsidies will become a bonanza for corruption. Any proposal that permits the rental or
sale of units under market value will be abused. While I detest this result, and the
abuse of trust which it will involve, it will inevitably occur. If the Court must allow
set asides, it should permit them on a voluntary basis as part of the settlement of
exclusionary zoning cases and it should monitor the results. It should not be required
statewide before the Court has experience with the working of this novel approach.

Id.
'40 See F. CHAPIN & E. KAISER, supra note 118, at 504-05 for a discussion of constitutional
rights in land use planning.
141 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Rose, supra note 127, at 115.
No. L-36896-70 (Law Div. filed Sept. 2, 1971).
43

Id.
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The corporation would verify the low income status of the prospective purchaser by reviewing his assets, credit, employment, salary, and other income characteristics. If the person qualifies, the
board would approve his purchase of the unit. In this manner, the
town and the state are assured that the builder will sell the lower
income unit to a purchaser who is the intended beneficiary of the
Mount Laurel doctrine. The Bedminster mechanism also incorporates
other features. Priority for low income housing is given to qualified
persons living within ten miles of the project, and favorable mortgage
terms are offered as well.
It is clear from the above discussion that any developer planning
to build low income units in a municipality, whether under the town's
existing zoning laws or pursuant to a court-ordered builder's remedy,
should develop a proposal for the resolution of the selection and
monitoring problems. It is in the developer's interest to do so, because
if he does not, the void will be filled by a proposal from the municipality, the master, or the court, which the builder may find either
impractical or economically unacceptable in light of his plans. The
builder should therefore direct his planning expert to carefully develop specific proposals concerning at least three areas.
First, a builder's proposal should set forth procedures to assure
that the low cost units which are built will actually be sold to qualified low income buyers. Second, the proposal should detail resale and
rerental restrictions to assure that the future disposition of the unit
will adhere to the low income purpose of the initial approval. Both of
these provisions could be supplemented by a proposed structure for a
nonprofit "Public Trust" corporation designed to oversee and enforce
the implementation of the restrictions.
If the units are to be built under a mandatory set-aside program,
the Mount Laurel II court also stated that efforts should be made by
"courts, municipalities, and developers . .. to assure that lower income units are integrated into larger developments in a manner that
both provides adequate access and services for the lower income residents and at the same time protects as much as possible the value and
integrity of the project as a whole."' 4 4 Thus, the builder's proposal
under a mandatory set-aside program should also establish that his
plans will accomplish these goals. Once a builder has submitted a
proposal containing these three elements, he should be able to market

144

Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 268 n.32, 456 A.2d at 447 n.32.
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the project without fear of excessive disruption of his plans by the
court, the master, or the municipality. If changes in the proposal are
required in order to assure that the municipality's fair share obligation
continues to be met, the builder will at least be aware of them early
enough so that a rational decision as to whether to go through with
the project can be made.
As a municipality approves fair share construction, the central
issue will concern how to allocate the preemptive rights of competing
parties for the limited numbers of approved low and moderate income
fair share housing units, both at the time of initial sale and beyond. A
low cost purchaser could be selected from several sources, such as the
regional poor, the indigenous poor of the municipality, residents of
the project in which the unit is located, and residents of other low cost
housing projects in the municipality. The courts must establish guidelines to resolve the competition for the available low income units. In
doing so, it would seem practical to create a preemptive right in favor
of low income persons who have resided in the particular municipality
for a minimum period of time prior to the unit becoming available. A
more difficult issue is the assignment of priority rights among municipal residents who satisfy the criteria. One solution could be the creation of intramunicipal guidelines which might, for example, be based
upon need, family size, and stability of income.
The availability of such guidelines, along with the development
of viable restrictive disposition covenants in the deeds or leases of low
income units, would make the administration of the Public Trust
control mechanism a manageable task. By the same token, once such
procedures are firmly established, developers will be able to proceed
with a reasonable degree of certainty that their building plans will not
be disrupted by the need to resolve the problems of the initial selection
and future monitoring of low income buyers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Mount Laurel decisions have established a constitutional
right to obtain affordable housing in any New Jersey municipality
which has not met its fair share obligation. The ultimate question,
however, is whether a substantial amount of housing will result from
this constitutional right. Two major obstacles threaten to frustrate this
goal. Currently the judiciary stands alone to implement the principle
of fair share housing as municipalities, the legislature, and, most
recently, the governor, have aligned against it. As judicial panels,
serving as "super-zoners," decide a number of important legal issues, a
considerable body of law will develop. Hopefully, during this process,
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the municipalities and the legislature will cease their opposition to the
Mount Laurel mandate as they become more comfortable with it.
Additionally, it remains to be seen whether builders can earn enough
profit when given the chance by Mount Laurel judges to construct low
and moderate income housing. If such construction is not sufficiently
profitable, builders will lack incentive to enforce the fair share mandate.
Finally, the building of affordable housing will hinge, in part, on
the role of the attorney. This article has raised the pertinent questions
a practitioner must ask and has outlined the zoning and planning
procedures he or she must follow in the wake of Mount Laurel II.
Notwithstanding the existing uncertainties, it should be the attorney's
duty to work constructively within the guidelines of Mount Laurel II,
not only to benefit a particular client, but ultimately to promote the
objectives of fair share housing as well.

